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Abstract
At the start of their term, politicians often announce which issue they intend to address. To shed
light on this agenda setting, we develop a model in which a politician has to decide whether or not to
address a public issue. Addressing an issue means that the politician investigates the issue and next
chooses for either a major reform or a minor reform. Not addressing an issue means that the status
quo is maintained. Politicians di¤er in their ability to make correct decisions. They want to make good
decisions and want to come across as able decision makers. An important characteristic of the model is
that politicians and voters have di¤erent priors concerning the desirability of a major reform. We show
that electoral concerns may lead to anti-pandering. Politicians tend to put issues on their political agenda
when voters are relatively pessimistic about a major reform, and keep issues o¤ the table when voters are
optimistic about major reform.
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1 Introduction
Public policy covers a wide range of activities and topics. Political leaders cannot pay full
attention to all these activities. They have to set priorities. We say that a political leader
puts an issue on the political agenda when she publicly announces that she will address that
issue in her term. The following three examples illustrate what we mean by agenda-setting
behavior.1
One of President Obamas most cited promises during the 2008 US elections was to close
down Guantanamo bay detention center. Publicly committed to addressing this issue, the
president signed an executive order to close down the detention center only two months
after his election (Mazzetti and Glaberson, 2009). While advancing the shutdown, the legal,
practical and political hurdles involved in this decision began to surface.2 By mid-2011,
after only mild changes in its operation were implemented, president Obama had e¤ectively
decided not to proceed with the shutting down of the center (Finn and Kornblut, 2011).
In 2012 Benjamin Netanyahu, Israels prime minister, declared that "All threats [to Is-
rael . . . ] are dwarfed by another threat [Iran](Teibel, 2012) as part of an ongoing public
commitment to deal with this issue. Netanyahu and others also acknowledged that not all
information was yet available for a decision on the best course of action (Bergman, 2012).
Two main possibilities seemed to be considered by the Israeli government, a continued push
for international action or a military attack. As of September 2012, a decision has not been
publicly made.
Recently, Britains PM David Cameron publicly announced that he will not make any
decision on the expansion of Heathrow airport before 2015 (Winnett, 2012). This announce-
ment was a response to growing concerns that Britain urgently requires an increase in airport
capacity (Stringer, 2012). Airport capacity will thus remain unchanged for the next years.
In each of the above examples, a political leader makes a public announcement about his
political agenda. The rst two examples portray a public commitment to address a public
issue. This commitment was followed by exploration of the optimal policy response, and
concluded by a decision (or future decision) on policy. The last example describes a public
pledge not to approach a policy issue. The status quo was maintained.
For political economists and political scientists, the existence of agenda setting means
that it is not enough to explain why in a certain policy domain (say health care) a politician
1 In the literature agenda setting has two meanings. First, it means the control over the issues under consideration. Second,
it means the order of proposals within a single issue area (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978). This paper is about the rst meaning.
2For example, it was shocking to the presidents team that only about 20, later 36, of the detainees in the camp could
be prosecuted in US civil courts. The number was thought by the team to be much higher previous to elections. (Finn and
Kornblut, 2011, p. 4).
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selected one course of action (say the A¤ordable Care Act3) out of many alternatives. They
should also explain why the domain was on the politicians political agenda in the rst
place. In this paper we address the question of why a politician places a certain issue on
the political agenda or keep that issue o¤ it. In democratic systems, we expect that a
politicians agenda is at least partially inuenced by the desires of the electorate. As long as
voters have an unbiased view of the pros and cons of alternative policy options, the idea that
voters inuence politiciansagenda-setting behavior is an appealing feature. However, there
is strong evidence that at least for some issues voters have biased views. A famous example is
votersbiases toward protectionism. Voters regard protectionism a better instrument in the
ght against unemployment than most economists and politicians.4 Rational politicians will
be aware that putting an issue on the political agenda may create expectations. A possible
implication is that a politician may be reluctant to put trade policy on her agenda if she
anticipates that voters will punish her for failing to enforce a strict policy.
To gain insight into agenda-setting behavior of politicians, we develop a model in which
a society faces some problem. A politician has to decide whether or not to put this problem
on the political agenda. Putting a problem on the agenda means that the politician publicly
announces her intention to address the problem. Addressing the problem is followed by 1) an
investigation of the problem, and 2) a binary decision between a minor shift in policy (a minor
reform) and a major shift (a major reform). If the problem is not placed on the political
agenda then no change in policy is enacted. Our model exhibits two key characteristics.
First, apart from wanting to make the socially optimal decision, the politician is concerned
with her reputation for being an able decision maker. The idea is that a good reputation
enhances the politicians chances of reelection. In our model the di¤erence between an able
and a less able politician is that an able politician receives private information about the need
for a major reform, while a less able politician does not. We assume that from a social point
of view, the politician should only choose a major reform if she received information that the
major reform is benecial. An implication is that a choice for a major reform suggests that
the politician is able.
Second, we assume heterogeneous prior beliefs in the sense that the probability that the
representative voter assigns to the need for a major reform deviates from the probability that
the politician assigns to it. This characteristic implies that relative to the politician, the voter
can be pessimistic or optimistic about the need for a major reform. These two characteristics
3O¢ cally known as the Patient Protection and A¤ordable Care Act, and more commonly known as Obamacare. This highly
debated law introduced major changes into the American health system.
4Politicians are not necessarily policy experts but it stands to reason that they have easy access to policy expertise. Addi-
tionally, they have a much stronger incentive to aquire policy relevant knowledge than individual voters have.
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allow us to examine whether electoral concerns induce the politician to pander, that is, to
bias agenda-setting and decision-making toward the voters prior beliefs.
We derive three sets of results. Our rst result concerns the way the electorate perceives
the behavior of the politician. The voter anticipates that electoral concerns may induce a
less able politician to distort her decision to a major reform. The reason is that, as discussed
above, a choice for a major reform improves the politicians reputation. The stronger are
electoral concerns, the stronger is the incentive to distort. Moreover, the more optimistic the
voter is about the consequences of a major reform, the more the voter expects the politician
to distort her decision.
The second set of results pertains to the politicians actual decision on the reform. We
show that if the voter is more optimistic about the consequences of a major reform than
the politician, the politician is reluctant to distort the decision on the reform. From a
reputational point of view, choosing a major reform improves the politicians reputation.
However, because the politician is relatively pessimistic about a major reform, she is less
inclined to choose a major reform than the voter believes she is. If the voter is relatively
pessimistic about the consequences of a major reform, the reverse holds. The politician is
more inclined to choose a major reform than the voter believes.
Our third set of results concerns the politicians agenda setting behavior. By not putting
the problem on the political agenda, the politician does not have to make a decision on a
reform, and consequently ensures that the issue does not a¤ect her reputation. Two issues are
at stake when making the agenda-setting decision. First, does addressing the problem lead
to a proper solution for it, and second, does addressing the problem boost the politicians
reputation? If the voter is optimistic, the politician anticipates that her expected reputation
decreases. As a result, the politician is less inclined to put the problem on her agenda. If
the voter is pessimistic, the politician may distort the decision, but her expected reputation
improves. We show that the latter e¤ect dominates the former. So, with a pessimistic
electorate, the politician is more likely to put a problem on the agenda. while with an
optimistic electorate the opposite holds. One may regard this result as anti-pandering. The
politician agenda-setting behavior is biased against the beliefs of the electorate. This result is
consistent with Kingdon (1984) who nds that many issues rise on political agendas without
public support.
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2 Related literature
This paper contributes to a voluminous literature that tries to explain policy. In much of
the existing literature, the emphasis is on how political competition inuences politicians
choices in a given area. For example, using a Downsian model of electoral competition,
Meltzer and Richard (1981) try to explain redistribution. They show that the redistribution
policy coincides with the policy the median voter prefers. The Downsian model can be
applied to all kinds of policies (see Mueller, 2003, and Persson and Tabellini, 2002). Given a
policy domain, the model generates a median voter result. Our model does not take a policy
domain as given. Rather it tries to explain why in some years policy focuses on redistribution
while in other years it focuses on health care issues. As in other political economic studies,
policy outcomes and electoral concerns play an important role.
As mentioned above, a key characteristic of our model is that voters and politicians have
di¤erent prior beliefs. The notion that many voters are poorly informed is widely accepted.
Illustrative is Bartels (1996) who writes The political ignorance of the American voter is
one of the best-documented features of contemporary politics. Downs (1957) pointed out
that voters have no incentives to become informed. Voters are rationally ignorant. For a
long time, however, many economists have rejected the idea that voters have systematically
biased beliefs. Recently, Caplan (2008) has challenged the idea that voters have unbiased
expectations. For a wide variety of issues, he shows that votersand economistsbeliefs di¤er
signicantly. To come back to our earlier example, he nds that indeed voters hold the view
that protectionism helps the economy while economists generally reject this view. It is worth
emphasizing that the fact that votersbeliefs are systematically biased does not imply that
voters are irrational. When incentives to acquire information are weak, the assumption that
votersbeliefs are unbiased is a strong one.
The notion that electoral concerns may lead politicians to choose unexpected policies is not
new. Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) discuss several examples of reforms implemented by
politicians whose traditional position was to oppose such reforms. A key feature of the model
they have developed to explain unexpected reforms is that politicians have better information
about circumstances than voters. Politicianschoices therefore contain information about
external circumstances. A politician who implements a policy that is against his ideology
shows that circumstances are very much in favor for that policy. Voters infer that the policy
deserves support. Our model di¤ers from that of Cukierman and Tommasi in two main
respects. First, in our model, policies do not only contain information about circumstances,
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but also about the politicians ability. Second, apart from explaining unexpected policies,
our model explains why some problems are put on the political agenda and others are not.
In Letterie and Swank (1998) politicians possess superior information as to how the econ-
omy works. They show that in a partisan world, politicians have incentives to pretend that
they believe in a view of the economy that ts with their preferences. Partisan preferences
lead to partisan views of the economy. The implication is a further polarization of policies.
This result can also be interpreted as anti-pandering. Politicians choose policies that are
further away from the policy most preferred by the median voter.
More recently, in a Downsian setting, Kartik et al. (2012) provide an explanation for
anti-pandering in politics. Two candidates receive a private signal about the state of the
world. On the basis of this signal, each candidate chooses a platform. Their paper shows
that candidates overreact to their signal: they have an incentive to choose a platform that
is more extreme than their signal. The reason for this overreacting is that at the elections,
voters observe two platforms and can infer two signals. The implication is that they tend
to prefer the more extreme platform, because they rely less on their prior belief than each
politician. An important di¤erence between the model by Kartik et al. and ours is that in
Kartik et al. elections revolve around choosing proper policies, whereas in our model elections
revolve around choosing the most competent candidate.
There are also papers that show that electoral concerns may induce politicians to choose
policies that are consistent with votersbeliefs. An early example of such a contribution is
Harrington (1993) who assumes that votersbeliefs as to policy consequences di¤er. Electoral
concerns induce politicians to choose policy that is consistent with the view of the economy
held by the median voter. His model thus explains pandering rather than anti-pandering. In
our model, we do not model political competition directly. Rather we assume that electoral
concerns provide incentives to politicians to come across as good decision makers. In this
respect our paper builds on Rogo¤ (1990).5 By focusing on coming across as competent, we
ignore possible ideological di¤erences between candidates. Of course, ideology may also help
to explain why some problems are on the political agenda while others are not.
3 The Model
We consider a society that faces some problem, x. A politician (she) can decide to address
the problem (to put it on the political agenda), r = 1, or not to address it (not to put it on
5Rogo¤ (1990) builds on the seminal paper on career concerns by Holmstrom (1999). Like us, Suurmond et al. (2004) focus
on agents who are concerned with a repuation for being able decision makers.
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the political agenda), r = 0. The electorate, to which we refer as the voter (he), observes r.
Putting the problem on the political agenda (r = 1) means that the politician (1) investigates
the problem, and (2) makes a binary decision on it: x 2 fH;Lg, where x = H denotes that
the politician chooses a major shift in policy, and x = L denotes that the politician chooses
a minor shift in policy. A choice for r = 0 implies no shift in policy.
In case the politician addresses the problem, she incurs a cost c0. This c0 is randomly
drawn from a density function f (c0), with f (c0) = 0 for c0 < k and f (c0) > 0 for c0  k. The
politician observes c0, but the voter does not. c0 can be interpreted as the opportunity cost
of addressing problem x. By addressing x, less resources are available for addressing other
problems. Alternatively, c0 can be interpreted as the cost of investigating the consequences
of a major reform.
When the politician addresses the problem, the proper decision on x depends on the
state of the world,  2 f h; hg: x = H yields a payo¤ equal to p0 +    c, with p0 < 0,
and x = L yields a payo¤ equal to k   c0, with k  0. In case the politician does not
address the problem x, the politicians payo¤ is zero, by normalization. To ensure that the
model describes an interesting situation we assume that p0 + h > k and p0   h < k. The
restriction k > 0 implies that we focus on a situation where investigation of the project always
reveals small improvements. Such improvements are sometimes called low hanging fruit. The
stochastic term captures that the consequences of a major reform are often risky. Ex ante,
a major reform may improve matters or may make things worse. As we will show below,
the assumption that p0 < 0 means that the politician is biased against a major reform. In
the absence of further information about , she receives a higher payo¤ from a minor reform
than from a major reform. The case that p0 > 0 is the mirror case of p0 < 0. The analysis
of it would not generate new insights.
The prior probability that  = h equals the prior probability that  =  h, Pr ( = h) =
1
2 .
6 The politician knows this. The voter, by contrast, believes that the prior probability
that  = h equals . Moreover, the voter believes that the politicians prior that  = h also
equals . The voters perception is common knowledge. By allowing the voters prior to di¤er
from that of the politician, the voter and the politician may have di¤erent predispositions
towards a major reform. Suppose r = 1. Then, in the absence of information about ,
the politician believes that a major reform yields a lower payo¤ than a minor reform, as
p0 < 0. If  >
h (po k)
2h , the voter beliefs that a major reform yields a higher payo¤ than
a minor reform in the absence of information about . In other words, he is optimistic in
6 In Appendix B we show that assuming Pr ( = h) =  instead of assuming Pr ( = h) = 1
2
does not a¤ect our results
qualitatively.
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Figure 1: Dention of voters type by voters prior
an absolute sense about the outcome of a major reform. If  > h (po k)2h , we call the voter
overly optimistic. If 12 <  <
h (po k)
2h , without information about , the voter prefers a
minor reform to a major reform. However, he is more optimistic about a major reform than
the politician. In this situation, we call the voter (relatively) optimistic. In case  < 12 ,
we call the voter pessimistic. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the voters type
dichotomy.
A politician who chooses r = 1 receives a private signal, s 2 f h; h;?g about the state.
If s = ?, the signal does not contain information about . If s 6= ?, then s is fully
informative, s = . There are two types of politicians, t 2 fD;Sg, dumb (t = D) and
smart (t = S) ones. The prior probability that a politician is smart equals : Pr (t = S) = 
and Pr (t = D) = 1   . This is common knowledge. At the beginning of the game neither
the politician herself nor the voter knows the politicians type. A smart politician always
receives an informative signal, Pr (s = jt = S) = 1. A dumb politician always receives
s = ?, Pr (s = ?jt = D) = 1.7 After having received s, the politician makes a decision on x.
At the end of the game, the voter forms a belief about the probability that the politician
is smart. We assume that when the voter updates her belief, she observes r and x. In the
conclusions we come back to this assumption. We denote by ^ (r; x) the posterior probability
that the politician is smart, conditional on r and x. We refer to ^ (r; x) as the politicians
reputation.
Apart from wanting to take the right decision and incurring c0 when r = 1, the politician
wishes to come across as a smart decision maker. The idea is that a reputation for being smart
enhances the politicians electoral prospects. The politicians preferences are represented by
7The assumption that a smart politician always receives an informative signal, and a dumb politician never receives an
informative signal is made to reduce straightforward algebra. What matters for our results qualitatively is that smart politicians
receive an informative signal with a higher probability than dumb ones.
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the following functions, U (r; x):
U (1; H) = p0 + + ^ (1; H)  c0 (1)
U (1; L) = k + ^ (1; L)  c0
U (0; 0) = ^ (0; 0)
where  denotes the weight the politician attributes to his reputation. With no loss of
generality we dene p = p0   k and c = c0   k, and write the politician preferences as:
U (1; H) = p+ + ^ (1; H)  c (2)
U (1; L) = ^ (1; L)  c
U (0; 0) = ^ (0; 0)
We assume that social welfare is given by (2) with  = 0. From a social point of view,
the politician should choose x = H if and only if she received s = h. We speak about an
undistorted decision rule if the politician chooses x = H if s = h, and x = L otherwise.
Given that the politician takes the socially optimal decision on x, she should choose r = 1 if
and only if c  12 (p+ h).
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. Nature chooses t 2 fD;Sg,  2 f h; hg and c. The politician observes c.
2. The politician chooses r. If r = 0, then x = 0 and the game proceeds to 5. If r = 1,
then the game proceeds to
3. The politician receives a signal about , s 2 f h; h;?g.
4. The politician chooses x 2 fH;Lg.
5. The voter updates his belief about the politicians type on the basis of r and x.
6. Payo¤s are realized.
Our model is a dynamic game with incomplete information. It deviates from a more
standard game in that the voters and politicians priors with respect to the states di¤er.
We solve the model in three steps. First, we identify a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of
the game under the assumptions that r = 1, and both the voter and politician assign prior
probability  to the event that  = h. This equilibrium describes the voters world and
delivers the voters beliefs about the politicians strategy on x, given r = 1. We denote by
 (s) the voters belief about the politicians strategy on x, given r = 1. It maps signal s to
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a probability with which the voter believes the politician to choose a major reform, x = H.
The posterior probabilities, ^ (1; L) and ^ (1; H), result from the conjectured equilibrium
strategy on x through Bayesrule. In identifying the equilibrium we ignore equilibria which
can only be sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Second, given equilibrium behavior as
perceived by the voter, we derive the politicians optimal strategy on x, which we denote
by  (s). It maps s to a probability with which the politician chooses x = H. Finally, we
determine agenda setting behavior. The politician chooses r so as to maximize her expected
utility, anticipating her own equilibrium strategy on x,  (s), and how in equilibrium her
actions will be perceived by the voter,  (s). As to r, the politician equilibrium strategy can
be represented by a threshold strategy. She chooses r = 1 if and only if c  c. At c = c,
the politician is indi¤erent between r = 0 and r = 1.
4 The Voters World
In this section, we derive the politicians optimal strategy as conceived by the voter. To this
end, we identify a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of our game in which both the voter and the
politician assign prior probability  to the event that  = h. We pretend that this prior is
common knowledge. For the moment, we assume that r = 1. At the end of this section, we
turn to the case that r = 0.
We start with identifying the conditions under which in the voters perception the politi-
cian does not distort the decision on x. This means that in the voters perception a smart
politician should follow her signal. As discussed in the previous section, if the voter is not
overly optimistic,   h p2h , the undistorted decision rule stipulates that a dumb politician
chooses x = L. If, by contrast, the voter is overly optimistic,  > h p2h , the undistorted
decision rule stipulates that a dumb politician chooses x = H. For ease of exposition we now
dene this benchmark as ~  h p2h . Below we discuss the two situations.
Situation 1: The voter is not overly optimistic,  < ~
The undistorted decision strategy is
 (s) =
8<: 1 if s = h0 otherwise. (3)
Given (3), the voter infers from x = H that the politician must be smart, ^ [1; H; (s)] = 1,
as only smart politicians receive s = h. A choice for x = L, by contrast, can be the result
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of a smart politician who observed s =  h and a dumb politician. Bayes rule implies:
^ [1; L; (s)] =
(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) =
1 
1 .
The posteriors imply that x = H improves the politicians reputation, whereas x = L
damages it. As a result, if the politician is su¢ ciently concerned about her reputation, the
voter conjectures that the politician has an incentive to choose x = H, even though s 6= h.
This temptation is strongest for a dumb politician. Hence, (3) can only be the conjectured
equilibrium strategy for the politician if
 (p+ h) + (1  ) (p  h) + ^ [1; H; (s)]  ^ [1; L; (s)]
Using the expression for the posteriors, we can rewrite this equation as
   = [ p+ (1  2)h] (1  )
1  
where  is the perceived threshold level of electoral concerns.
Now suppose that  > . Then, with ^ [1; H; (s)] = 1 and ^ [1; L; (s)] = 1 1 ,
it is optimal for a dumb politician to choose x = H. However, a conjectured decision-rule
"choose x = L if and only if s =  h" cannot be part of an equilibrium. If it were, then for
s = ?, x = L would yield a better reputation as well as a higher expected payo¤ than x = H.
In fact, ^ [1; H; (s)] > ^ [1; L; (s)] requires that for s = ?, the politician chooses x with
a probability smaller than  for any value of .8
All in all, the discussion above indicates that if  >  the voter believes that the politician
follows a mixed strategy:
 (s) =
8>><>>:
1 if s = h
 if s = ?
0 otherwise.
(4)
with  implicitly dened by
p+ h(2  1) + ^ [1; H; (s)] = ^ [1; L; (s)] (5)
Together (3-5) describe the voters perception of the politicians decision strategy for
various values of . If   , the voter expects the politician not to distort the decision
on x. For  > , the voter expects a dumb politician to choose x = H with probability .
Bayesrule implies
^ [1; H; (s)] =

 +  (1  ) (6)
^ [1; L; (s)] =
(1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) (1  )
8Using Equation (6) it is easy to show that ^ [1; H; (s)] > ^ [1; L; (s)] requires  < .
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Note that the conjectured decision strategy of the politician depends on the voters prior that
 = h; not on the politicians prior.
The analysis above shows that if the voter is not overly optimistic, x = H yields a better
reputation than x = L. The implication is that if the politician is su¢ ciently concerned with
her reputation, the voter conjectures that with some positive probability a dumb politician
chooses x = H.
Situation 2: The voter is overly optimistic,   ~
If the voter is overly optimistic, in his perception the undistorted decision rule is
 (s) =
8<: 0 if s =  h1 otherwise. (7)
Given (7), the voter infers from x = L that the politician is smart, ^ [1; L; (s)] = 1.
The politicians reputation deteriorates when the voter observes x = H, ^ [1; H; (s)] =

1 (1 ) < . The implication is that if  is su¢ ciently large,  > 
0
, the politician has
an incentive to deviate from (7):
 < 
0
 =
[p  h (1  2)] (1  (1  ))
1  
Analogous to the rst situation, if  > 0, the voter does not expect a dumb politician to
always choose x = L. Instead, the politician is conjectured to follow the mixed strategy:
 (s) =
8>><>>:
1 if s = h
 if s = ?
0 otherwise.
(8)
where  is implicitly dened by:
p+ h (2  1) + ^ [1; H; (s)] = ^ [1; L; (s)] (9)
with ^ [1; H; (s)] and ^ [1; L; (s)] given by (6). In contrast to situation 1, and for similar
reasons, in any equilibrium in mixed strategies we must have that  > .
The upshot is that in case the voter is overly optimistic about a major reform, the voter
believes that electoral concerns may induce a dumb politician to choose for a minor reform.
How does the voter conceive the politicians decision on r?
So far we have assumed that r = 1. Using the strategies the voter believes the politician
to follow, he can derive the politicians expected utility resulting from r = 1. The voter
does not know the cost c associated with addressing an issue, but knows the underlying cost
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distribution f (c). By assumption, when choosing r, the politician does not know her type.
The voter knows this. From the perspective of the voter, a high cost c must be the reason
for the politician to choose not do address an issue. Bayesrule implies that if the politician
chooses r = 0, the politicians reputation remains ^ (0; 0) = .
5 The Politician
In equilibrium, the politicians strategy on r and x should be optimal given the voters beliefs
about (i) the politicians strategy and (ii) the politicians type. The politician anticipates
that the voter interprets her behavior as described in the previous section. Four cases can
be distinguished: 1.  < ~ and   ; 2.  < ~ and  > ; 3.  > ~ and   0; and 4.
 > ~ and  > 0. In this section, we describe the politicians equilibrium strategies on r
and x for each case.
In each case the optimal response of a smart politician is to make a decision on x that is
in line with her signal,  (h) = 1 and  ( h) = 0. So, with respect to x, a smart politician
acts the way the voter perceives a smart politician to act [ (h) = 1 and  ( h) = 0].
The reason is that a smart politician faces exactly the same decision problem as the voter
perceived her to face. She knows the state and takes the voters updated beliefs into account.
Having established the optimal response with respect to x of a smart politician, the discussion
below focuses on the optimal response with respect to x of a dumb politician.
When choosing r, the politician does not know her type. She decides to address x if
her expected utility from addressing it is higher than her outside utility ^ (0; 0) = . The
politician expected utility U (r = 1; (s)), conditional on her equilibrium strategy on x, is9
E [U (r = 1; (s))] =
1
2
h+

1
2
 +  (?)  (1  )

(10)
 (p+  (^ [1; H; ]  ^ [1; L; ])) + ^ [1; L; ]  c
In each of the four cases examined below the optimal decision strategies, actual and
perceived ( (?) and , respectively), di¤er. In turn, each case leads to a di¤erent condition
determining the politician choice on r.
Case 1: The voter is not overly optimistic and does not expect the politician to
distort the decision on x:  < ~ and   .
In this case, x = H improves the politicians reputation, while x = L damages it. Moreover,
electoral concerns are weak such that the voter does not expect the politician to distort the
9For derivations see Appendix A.
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decision on x.
First suppose that r = 1, and consider a dumb politicians decision on x. Does a dumb
politician have an incentive to deviate from the undistorted decision rule? If s = ?, x = H
yields a payo¤ p +    c, while x = L yields a payo¤  1 1    c. It directly follows that a
dumb politician chooses x = L if
   =  p (1  )
1  
and x = H if  > . Recall that in case 1,  < . Using (5), one can show that  > 
requires that the voter is pessimistic about a major reform,  < 12 . The reason is that if
 < 12 , the voter believes that  =  h is more likely than it actually is. The voter thus
overestimates the cost of x = H. This makes him believe that with moderate electoral
concerns   , a dumb politician does not choose x = H. Since the actual cost of x = H
is lower for a dumb politician, she may be willing to choose x = H. The reverse holds if the
voter is optimistic about a major reform,  > 12 . The actual cost of choosing x = H for a
dumb politician is higher than the cost perceived by the voter. As an optimistic voter does
not expect a dumb politician to distort in the present case, a dumb politician never distorts
her decision on x.
Now consider the agenda-setting decision, r. Suppose that electoral concerns are low
  . In equilibrium, as discussed above, a dumb politician chooses x = L. The politicians
expected payo¤ from r = 1 then equals
1
2
 (p+ h) + E [^ (r = 1; (?) = 0)]  c
where E [^ (r = 1; (?) = 0)] = 1 
1
2
+( 12 )
1   denotes the politicians expected reputation
at the moment she chooses r = 1, given her equilibrium strategy on x. The politicians
expected payo¤ from r = 0 equals . So, r = 1 yields a higher expected payo¤ than r = 0
if
c <
1
2
 (p+ h) + 
 
1
2   

(1  )
1   (11)
The rst term in (11) is the expected payo¤ from addressing the issue. Since the politician
does not distort her policy decision, a major reform is chosen only in case the politician is
smart and with probability Pr ( = h) = 12 . The second term denotes the di¤erence between
the reputational benet from addressing the problem and not addressing it.
Notice that if  = 12 , the second term of the right-hand side of (11) equals zero. The
reason is that for  = 12 , E [^ (r = 1;
 (?) = 0)] = . This reects the Martingale property.
The implication is that for  = 12 electoral concerns do not inuence the agenda-setting
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decision. As E [^ (r = 1; (?) = 0)] decreases in , a lower value of  widens the range
of parameters for which the politician puts x on the political agenda. The e¤ect of  on
the agenda-setting decision depends on whether  is smaller or larger than 12 . If the voter
is optimistic about a major reform, electoral concerns weaken the politicians incentives to
choose r = 1. The reason is that if  > 12 , the voter assigns a high probability to the event
that a smart politician chooses x = H. However, the politician anticipates that if she is
smart, she will choose x = H only with probability 12 . As a result, in expected terms, for
 > 12 , r = 1 damages the politicians reputation. For  <
1
2 , the opposite holds.
Now suppose that electoral concerns are high  > . In equilibrium a dumb politician
chooses x = H. Choosing r = 1 yields an expected reputation equal to
E [^ (r = 1; (?) = 1)] =
1    + 12 (1  )
1  
which is larger than . The payo¤ from choosing r = 1 exceeds the payo¤ from r = 0 if
c <
1
2
h+

1  1
2


p+ 
1     (1  ) + 12 (3  )
1   (12)
Recall that  >  requires that the voter is pessimistic about a major reform,  < 12 . It
follows that the last term in (12) is always positive and that electoral concerns increase the
politicians incentive to put x on the political agenda.
Proposition 1 Suppose  < ~ and   . Then, if the voter is optimistic about a major
reform ( > 12), the politician does not distort the decision on x, Moreover, electoral con-
cerns discourage the politician to put x on the political agenda. If, by contrast, the voter is
pessimistic about a major reform, the politician may distort the decision on x, and electoral
concerns encourage the politician to put x on the agenda.
The di¤erence between (11) and (12) is twofold. First, because of the distortion on x,
expected payo¤ from addressing is lower for  >  than for   . Of course, a lower
expected payo¤ discourages the politician to put x on the political agenda. Second, the
expected reputation is higher when the politician distorts her decision on x. The reason is
that for  > , a dumb politician is perceived as smart by the voter. The implication is that
if  > , an increase in  always encourages the politician to choose r = 1.
Case 2: The voter is not overly optimistic but expects the politician to distort
the decision on x:  < ~ and  > 
As in case 1, in case 2 a choice of x = H improves the politicians reputation, while x = L
15
damages it. Unlike in case 1, in case 2, the voter expects a dumb politician to distort the
decision on x with positive probability  (?) = .
First consider the politicians strategy on x. For a dumb politician x = H yields a higher
payo¤ than x = L if p+ ^ (1; H; )  c > ^ (1; L; )  c. Using (5), one can show that this
amounts to  < 12 . Hence, a dumb politician always distorts the decision on x if the voter is
pessimistic, and never distorts it if the voter is optimistic.
To understand this result consider the case that  = 12 . In that case the politicians
behavior is identical to her behavior as perceived by the voter. A dumb politician is indi¤erent
between x = L and x = H. If the voter is optimistic, a dumb politician has a lower expected
payo¤ from x = H than the voter. As a result, the politician strictly prefers x = L. If,
by contrast, the voter is pessimistic, a dumb politician attaches a lower cost to x = H and
strictly prefers x = H.
Let us now turn to the agenda-setting decision. We have shown above that for  > ,
a dumb politician never distorts her decision if the voter is optimistic, and always distorts
her decision if the voter is pessimistic. Using (5), one can show that for  > 12 the politician
places the problem on the agenda if10
c <
1
2
 (p+ h) +

1
2
 ( p+ h (1  2))

 



(  ) (1  )
1   (1  )  

(13)
For  < 12 , r = 1 yields a higher expected payo¤ to the politician than r = 0 if
c <

1
2
h+

1  1
2


p

+

1  1
2


( p+ h (1  2))

 



(  ) (1  )
1   (1  )  

(14)
In (13) and (14) the rst term, represents the expected policy outcome given the politicians
strategy  (?) = 0 and  (?) = 1, respectively. In line with intuition, if the politician
anticipates that she may distort the decision on x, she is less inclined to put x on her political
agenda. The last two terms represent the net utility gain from expected reputation. The
expression  p+ h (1  2) is equal to the expected utility gain in reputation resulting from
choosing a major reform instead of a minor reform. It is multiplied by the probability the
politician selects a major reform. From equation (5) it follows that this part is independent
of . That is, a change in  is exactly matched by a change in the perceived probability of
distortion , such that the utility gain from choosing a major shift remains the same. The
last term in (13) and (14) is equal to the expected utility gain from choosing x = L on the
one hand, and not addressing the issue on the other,  [^ (1; L; )  ^ (0; 0)]. It is always
10For derivations see Appendix A.
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negative and decreasing in .11 Hence, (13) and (14) imply that if the voter believes that
the politician distorts the decision on x, electoral concerns discourage politicians to put x on
the political agenda.
Proposition 2 Suppose  < ~ and  > . Then, if the voter is optimistic about  ( > 12),
the politician does not distort the decision on x. If the voter is pessimistic about , the
politician always distorts the decision on x. Moreover, electoral concerns  discourage the
politician to put x on the political agenda.
Proposition 2 illustrates that the more the voter expects the politician to distort her
decision on x, the more the politician is reluctant to put x on her agenda. The intuition is
that if  < ~ and  > , voters are uncertain about the reason why a politician has chosen
a major reform. Is it because she observed s = h or is it because she wanted to pretend to
have observed s = h? The higher is , the more sceptical the voter becomes. One implication
is that for higher values of , a major reform becomes a weaker signal of high ability. With
more sceptical voters, politicians have less to win in terms of reputation by putting a problem
on her agenda.
Case 3: The voter is overly optimistic and does not expect the politician to
distort the decision on x,  > ~ and   0
In case 3, the voter is so optimistic about the benets of a major reform that he believes
that a dumb politician should implement it. The implication is that x = L improves the
politicians reputation, while x = H damages it. Moreover, in case 3, electoral concerns are
weak. The voter believes that a dumb politician chooses x = H.
Consider the politicians strategy on x. For a dumb politician it is a dominant strategy
to choose x = L.12 The reason is that x = L yields a higher project payo¤ than x = H and
leads to a better reputation. Anticipating her strategy on x, the politician prefers r = 1 to
r = 0 if
c <
1
2
 (p+ h) + 
 
1    1 + (1  )  32   
1  (1  )
!
(15)
Equation (15) shows that electoral concerns encourage the politician to put x on the political
agenda. The reason is that if the voter is overly optimistic, x = L improves the politicians
reputation. The voter expects a dumb politician to choose x = H. The politician anticipates
11Note that the perceived strategy of the politician is a function of electoral concerns  () where @
@
> 0. As  and  have
opposite e¤ects on this last term it has to be shown that the total e¤ect of  on expected utility is negative. See Appendix A
for a proof.
12A smart politician, having received s = H, prefers x = H to x = L if   (p+h)(1 )
1  . One can show that for  >
h p
2h
and   0, this inequality is always satised. Hence, in case 3, the politician has no incentive to distort the decision on x.
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Figure 2: Strategy and expected utility.
that if she is dumb, she will choose x = L. Putting x on the political agenda increases the
expected reputation of the politician.
Case 4: The voter is overly optimistic and expects the politician to distort the
decision on x,  > ~ and  > 0
As in case 3 the politician has no incentive to distort the decision on x. The strategy on
agenda setting is given by
c <
1
2
 (p+ h) +

1
2
 ( p+ h (1  2))

+



(   ) (1  )
1   (1  )  

Note that this condition is identical to condition (13). Since now  > , the propensity of
the politician to address the issue is increasing in . As the voter expects the politician to
mix, in comparison with case 3, electoral concerns have a smaller e¤ect on the politicians
agenda-setting decision.
Proposition 3 Suppose  > ~. Then, the politician does not distort the decision on x
regardless of the belief of the voter about . Electoral concerns always encourage the politician
to put x on the political agenda regardless of the voters beliefs.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that if the voter is overly optimistic, such that x = L improves
the politicians reputation, a dumb politician does not face a trade-o¤ between project payo¤
and electoral concerns. What is good project-wise is also good electoral-wise. Anticipating
this, electoral concerns encourage the politician to put x on her political agenda.
Figure 2 graphically summarizes the equilibrium analysis with respect to the voters prior
 and electoral concerns .13 Figure 2(a) presents a dumb politicians strategy on x. The
13Both graphs 2(a) and 2(b) are generated by using the parameter values p =  2, h = 3, c = 0 and  = 0:4.
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black boundaries separate the parameter space into four di¤erent areas which correspond to
the four di¤erent cases described in this section. The shaded area illustrates the parameter
combinations for which the politician distorts her decision on x,  (?) = 1. For all other
parameter values  (?) = 0. In our model, smart politicians never distort the decision on x.
If voters are not overly optimistic, a dumb politician has an incentive to distort the decision
on x. A major reform improves her reputation. However, a major reform is an inferior choice
policy wise. Figure 2(a) demonstrates that a dumb politician distorts the decision on x if
electoral concerns are su¢ ciently strong and voters are relatively pessimistic about a major
reform
 
 < 12

. For small values of , the electoral benets of a major reform does not
outweigh the costs of a distorted decision. If voters are relatively optimistic, the actual costs
of distorting the decision on x are higher than the costs as perceived by the voter. We have
shown that this implies that a dumb politician does not distort the decision on x. If voters
are pessimistic about a major reform, the actual costs of distorting the decision on x are
smaller than the costs voters perceive. As a result, the politician may distort the decision
on x. If voters are overly optimistic about a major reform [case 3 and 4 in 2(a)], a minor
reform boosts the politicians reputation. Consequently, the undistorted decision is optimal
both from a policy and electoral perspective.
Figure 2(b) presents a contour map of the politicians expected utility gain from placing
x on the agenda E [U (r = 1;; )] U (r = 0;). The lighter it is, the lower is the expected
gain. Figure 2(b) clearly shows that the voters beliefs are highly important for agenda
setting. If the voter is relatively pessimistic, electoral concerns encourage the politician to
put x on her political agenda. The reason is that relative to the voter, the politician assigns a
low probability that she will choose a minor reform. Since the voter expects a smart politician
to opt for a minor reform often, the reputational cost of doing so is relatively low. Addressing
the issue thus becomes attractive from an electoral point of view. If the voter is optimistic,
but not overly optimistic, electoral concerns discourage the politician to put x on her agenda.
In this situation, the politician assigns a lower probability to the event that she will choose
a major reform than the voter does. Finally, if the voter is overly optimistic, the politician
has a strong incentive to put x on her political agenda. In this case a minor reform is good
from an electoral perspective and likely to be good from a policy perspective.
6 Concluding remarks
Political leaders face numerous issues they can impossibly all address. This raises the question
of how politicians set priorities. This paper has tried to shed light on the types of issues
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politicians put on their political agendas. In our paper, putting an issue on the agenda
means that the politician must make a choice between a minor reform and a major reform
on that issue. A crucial feature of our model is that ex ante, relative to the politician, voters
can be optimistic or pessimistic about the need for a major reform. One might expect that
in such a model, electoral concerns would induce politicians to address issues about which
voters are relatively optimistic. We have shown that this intuition is not always correct. In
our model, unless voters are optimistic in an absolute sense, a politician is less likely to put
an issue on her political agenda if voters are relatively optimistic about the need for a major
reform. The reason is that if voters are relatively optimistic, the politician anticipates that
her ultimate decision may damage her reputation for being an able decision maker. By not
putting an issue on her agenda, the politician can avoid the reputational loss. If voters are
overly optimistic about an issue, electoral concerns make it more likely that the politician
addresses the issue.
As far as we know, hardly any economics literature on political agenda-setting exists.14 In
the political science literature, the best-known model of political agenda-setting is the garbage
can model (see Kingdon, 1984). The main point of this model is that the agenda-setting
process is disorganized, and hence unpredictable. A motivation for the garbage can model
was that Kingdon found that often issues rose on political agendas without public support
(Larocca, 2006). This empirical nding can be interpreted as anti-pandering. For Kingdon
this nding was inconsistent with a model in which rational politicians respond to the desires
of the electorate. Our paper shows that anti-pandering may result from rational politicians
who are concerned about winning elections. So, anti-pandering does not necessarily result
from a disorganized process.
Our model of agenda setting is based on several assumptions. Some of these assumptions
are made to drive home our main results in a simple way. For example, we have assumed that
the politician attributes a prior probability 12 to the event that a major reform is needed.
The voter by contrast attributes a prior probability  to this event. In Appendix B, we
analyze a more general model in which the politician attributes prior probability  to the
event that a major reform is needed. The analysis shows that the voters prior relative to
politicians prior drives the anti-pandering result. Thus the assumption that  = 12 does not
qualitatively a¤ect our main results.
Another innocuous assumption that when updating their beliefs about the politicians
ability voters do not observe the state. Quantitatively, this assumption is important. Politi-
14See Glazer and Lohman (1999) for an analysis of electoral agenda setting.
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cians are less likely to distort policy decisions and are less inclined to put issue on their
agendas when voters learn the state. Qualitatively, however, the results are una¤ected. The
main e¤ect of transparency is that it shifts votersattention from decisions to outcomes. This
reduces the politicians scope for a¤ecting her reputation.
The most unconventional assumptions of our model are the ones about the playerspriors.
We do not regard the assumption of heterogenous priors as a limitation for two reasons.
First of all, as discussed in the introduction, there is a lot of evidence that the priors of
voters and politicians actually do di¤er on many issues. Second, this assumption allows us
to identify the conditions under which politicians pander to voterspriors. The assumption
that politicians have a correct view of votersbeliefs, but voters have an incorrect view of
politiciansbeliefs is more restrictive. The usual motivation for this assumption is that politi-
cians, especially during political campaigns, spend much money on learning votersopinions
and beliefs. Voters, by contrast, have hardly incentives to become informed. The assumption
that voters believe that politicians have the same priors as themselves has been made for
simplicity. If we had assumed that voters are uncertain about politiciansbeliefs, policies
would have contained information about those beliefs. This has already been investigated
(see, for example, Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998). The simplication allowed us to focus
on politiciansincentives to pander.
21
References
Bartels, L. (1996). Uninformed votes: Information e¤ects in presidential elections. Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science, 194230.
Bergman, R. (2012, January 25). Will israel attack iran. Retrieved from http://www.
nytimes.com.
Caplan, B. (2008). The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies
(New Edition). Princeton University Press.
Cukierman, A. and M. Tommasi (1998). When does it take a nixon to go to china? Amer-
ican Economic Review , 180197.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper (New York).
Finn, P. and A. E. Kornblut (2011, April 20). Guantanamo bay: Why obama hasnt fullled
his promise to close the facility. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com.
Glazer, A. and S. Lohmann (1999). Setting the agenda: Electoral competition, commitment
of policy, and issue salience. Public Choice 99 (3), 377394.
Holmström, B. (1999). Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective. The Review
of Economic Studies 66 (1), 169182.
Kartik, N., F. Squintani, and K. Tinn (2012). Information revelation and (anti-) pandering
in elections. Working paper .
Kingdon, J. (1984). Agendas, alternatives and public policies. Little, Brown, Boston.
Larocca, R. (2006). The presidential agenda: sources of executive inuence in Congress.
The Ohio State University Press.
Letterie, W. and O. Swank (1998). Economic policy, model uncertainty and elections.
Economics & politics 10 (1), 85103.
Mazzetti, M. and W. Glaberson (2009, January 21). Obama issues directives to shut down
guantanamo. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com.
Meltzer, A. and S. Richard (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. The Journal
of Political Economy, 914927.
Mueller, D. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2002). Political economics: explaining economic policy. MIT
press.
22
Rogo¤, K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles. The American Economic Review ,
2136.
Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and
the status quo. Public choice 33 (4), 2743.
Stringer, D. (2012, September 5). Cameron: Britain to review its airport capacity. Re-
trieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk.
Suurmond, G., O. Swank, and B. Visser (2004). On the bad reputation of reputational
concerns. Journal of Public Economics 88 (12), 28172838.
Teibel, A. (2012, August 12). Israeli premier: Iran threat dwarfs all others. Retrieved from
http://www.guardian.co.uk.
Winnett, R. (2012, August 28). David cameron will not drop opposition to heathrow third
runway until at least 2015. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk.
23
A Appendix: Derivations and proofs
This section of the Appendix presents extended derivations of a few of the equations shown in the
paper as well as proofs of propositions.
A.1 Derivations
An extended derivation of the beliefs given in equation (6) is given below:
^ [1;H; (s)] = Pr (t = Sjx = H) = Pr (x = Hjt = S) Pr (t = S)
Pr (x = H)
=
Pr (x = Hjt = S) Pr (t = S)
Pr (x = Hjt = S) Pr (t = S) + Pr (x = Hjt = D) Pr (t = D)
=

 +  (1  )
^ [1; L; (s)] = Pr (t = Sjx = L) = Pr (x = Ljt = S) Pr (t = S)
Pr (x = L)
=
Pr (x = Ljt = S) Pr (t = S)
Pr (x = Ljt = S) Pr (t = S) + Pr (x = Ljt = D) Pr (t = D)
=
(1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) (1  )
We now present the full derivation of the politicians expected utility from putting a problem on
the agenda r = 1 as given in equation (10). The expected utility can be written as:
E [U (r = 1; (s))] = Pr (t = S)  [Pr (s = h)  U (1;H; s = h) + Pr (s =  h)  U (1; L)] +
Pr (t = D)  [ (s)  U (1;H; s = ?) + (1   (s))  U (1; L)]
Plugging in the values for probabilities and utilities:
E [U (r = 1; (s))] =  

1
2
 (p+ h+ ^ [1;H; ]  c) + 1
2
 (^ [1; L; ]  c)

+
Pr (t = D)  [ (?)  (p+ ^ [1;H; ]  c) + (1   (?))  (^ [1; L; ]  c)]
Which is equal to:
E [U (r = 1; (s))] =
1
2
h+

1
2
 +  (?)  (1  )

 (p+  (^ [1;H; ]  ^ [1; L; ])) + ^ [1; L; ]  c
The condition for the politician to place an issue on the political agenda is given by inequalities
(13) and (14). We present here the derivation of inequality (13). Since with  < 12 the politicians
strategy is  (?) = 0 we can rewrite equation (10) as:
E [U (r = 1; (s))] =
1
2
h+
1
2
  (p+  (^ [1;H; ]  ^ [1; L; ])) + ^ [1; L; ]  c
24
From (5) we know that p + ^ [1;H; (s)]   ^ [1; L; (s)] =  h(2   1). Plugging this
expression:
E [U (r = 1; (s))] =
1
2
h  1
2
  h(2  1) + ^ [1; L; ]  c
The politician opts to place an issue on the agenda only if her expected utility from doing so is
higher than her utility from not addressing an issue, such that:
E [U (r = 1; (s))] > U (r = 0) = 
Using equation (6) we can rewrite this condition as:
1
2
h  1
2
  h(2  1) +  (1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) (1  )    > c
or:
1
2
h  1
2
  h(2  1)  

(  ) (1  )
1   (1  )  

> c
To separate the e¤ects of expected policy outcome and reputation we add:
1
2
h+
1
2
p  1
2
p  1
2
  h(2  1)  

(  ) (1  )
1   (1  )  

> c
which becomes:
1
2
 (p+ h) +

1
2
 ( p+ (1  2)h)

 



(  ) (1  )
1   (1  )  

> c
The derivation of inequality (14) is identical.
A.2 Proof for Proposition 2 and Proposition 3
Proposition 2 states that increase in  discourages the politician from putting x on the politi-
cal agenda. Proposition 3 states that increase in  encourages the politician to put x on the
political agenda. From equations (13) and (14) we can observe that these statements are true i¤
d
d
h


( )(1 )
1  (1 )
i
> 0. This condition is not clearly satised since dd > 0 and
d
d
h
( )(1 )
1  (1 )
i
<
0. To show that it is satised we rst nd an expression for dd . Plugging equation (6) in (5) we
nd:

 +  (1  )  
(1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) (1  ) =  
1

(p+ h(2  1)) (16)
To nd dd we use implicit di¤erentiation:
d
d


 +  (1  )

d
d
  d
d

(1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) (1  )

d
d
=
d
d

  1

(p+ h(2  1))

where:
d
h

+(1 )
i
d
=
d
h
  ( +  (1  )) 1
i
d
=   ( +  (1  )) 2  (1  )
=     (1  )
( +  (1  ))2
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and:
d
h
(1 )
(1 )+(1 )(1 )
i
d
=
d
h
(1  )  ((1  ) + (1  ) (1  )) 1
i
d
=   (1  )  ((1  ) + (1  ) (1  )) 2  (  (1  ))
=
(1  ) (1  )
((1  ) + (1  ) (1  ))2
We can now write dd as:
d
d
=
  (p+ h(2  1))
2

 (1  )
( +  (1  ))2 +
(1  ) (1  )
((1  ) + (1  ) (1  ))2
 1
(17)
Note that this expression is positive for  < ~ (as   (p+ h(2  1)) > 0) and negative for  > ~.
Rewrite dd
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
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( )(1 )
1  (1 )

as:
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(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1  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
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
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 (1  )

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

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) (1  )
1      (1  )

d
d
which can be written as:
d
d



(  ) (1  )
1      (1  )

=  (1  )

(  )
(1      (1  ))  
 (1  )
(1      (1  ))2 
d
d

We thus need to show that the following condition holds:
(  )
(1      (1  ))  
 (1  )
(1      (1  ))2 
d
d
> 0
Rewrite equation (16) as  =   (p+ h(2  1))


+(1 )   (1 )(1 )+(1 )(1 )
 1
. We can now
plug this expression instead of  and dd from equation (17) to receive:
(  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1      (1  )) >

+(1 )   (1 )(1 )+(1 )(1 )

(+(1 ))2 +
(1 )
((1 )+(1 )(1 ))2
which becomes:
(  ) (1  ) (1      (1  ))
(
> 0 if  >  (proposition 2)
< 0 if  <  (proposition 3)
Since (  ) > 0 if  > , (  ) < 0 if  <  and (1  ) (1      (1  )) is always
positive, this condition always holds.
B Appendix: Changing politicians prior
We are now considering a model identical to the one presented in the paper but in the politicians
prior. we now assume that the politician prior Pr ( = h) =  where  2 [0; 1]. As a result, we
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write the politicians preference as:
U (1;H) = p+ h (2   1) + ^ (1;H)  c
U (1; L) = ^ (1; L)  c
U (0; 0) = ^ (0; 0)
The analysis of the voters world is identical to the analysis done in section (4) and we thus
directly start with the analysis of the politicians optimal choice of x and r given the beliefs of the
voter.
B.1 The Politician
In equilibrium, the politicians strategy on r and x should be optimal given the voters beliefs about
(1) the politicians strategy and (2) the politicians type. The politician anticipates that the voter
interprets his behavior as described in the previous section. Four cases can be distinguished: 1.
 < ~ and   ; 2.  < ~ and  > ; 3.  > ~ and   0; and 4.  > ~ and  > 0. In this
appendix, we describe the politicians equilibrium strategy on r and x only for case 1.
Case 1: The voter is not overly optimistic and does not expect the politician to distort
the decision on x:  < ~ and   .
In the rst case, x = H improves the politicians reputation, while x = L damages it. Moreover, the
voter believes that a dumb politician never distorts his decision and always chooses x = L. What
is the optimal response of the politician? Clearly, it is a dominant strategy to choose x = H if
s = h. If s = h, x = H is good decision-wise and reputation-wise. The politician has the strongest
incentive to deviate from the undistorted decision rule if s = ?. Then, x = H yields a payo¤
p+h (2   1)+  c, while x = L yields a payo¤  1 1   c. It directly follows that the politician
chooses x = L if:
 <  =
( p+ (1  2)h) (1  )
1  
and x = H if  > 
Note that  <  ( > ) if  >  ( < ). Similarly, when comparing to the basic model,
 <  ( > ) if  > 12 ( <
1
2). The higher is the politicians prior, the more attractive does
distorting seems to a dumb politician and the the larger  becomes. The politician, considering
whether to address the problem or not r 2 f0; 1g, takes into account the expected outcome of his
choice. She chooses the option that leads to a higher expected utility, where her expected utility
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from addressing the problem is given by:15
E [U (r = 1)] = 2h (1  ) + ( + (1  )  x (?)) (p+ (2   1)h+ ^ (1;H)  ^ (1; L))
+^ (1; L)  c
Now consider the agenda-setting decision, r. Suppose    . The politicians expected payo¤
from r = 1 equals:
E1 [^ (r = 1)] = ^ (1;H) + ( + (1  )) ^ (1; L)
=

1 +       (1  ) +  (1  2)
1  


The participation condition is:
c <  (p+ h) + 
      (1  ) + 2 (1  )
1  
With  >  The voter believes that the politician does not distort her decision but the politician
always distorts it when receiving an uninformative signal s = ?. This situation may arise only with
 > . The expected reputation of the politician from addressing the problem is:
E [^ (r = 1)] = ( + (1  )) ^ (1;H) + (1  )^ (1; L)
=
1   (+ (1  ) (1  ))
1  
As in the basic model, an increase in voter prior  decreases E [^ (r = 1)]. The participation
condition is:
c < h+ (1   (1  )) p+ 1   (2   + (  ) (1  ))
1  
15The full derivation of the expected utility from r = 1 is given by:
E [U (r = 1)] =  [p+ h+ ^ (1; H)] + (1  )^ (1; L) +
(1  )   (?)  [p+ (2   1)h+ ^ (1; H)] + (1  ) (1   (?))^ (1; L)  c
= ( + (1  )   (?)) p+ h+ (1  )   (?)  (2   1)h+ ( + (1  )   (?))^ (1; H)
+ (1      (?) + ))^ (1; L)  ^ (1; L) + ^ (1; L)  c
= 2h (1  ) + ( +  (?)  (1  )) (p+ (2   1)h+ ^ (1; H)  ^ (1; L)) + ^ (1; L)  c
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